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COJVTRIBUTIOXSOF THE THREE
D E TERMIJYA XTS TO THE R A TE OF
CHAXGE IX THE MOXEY STOCK
ALTHOUGH the three determinants of the money stock—high-powered
money, the currency ratio, and the reserve ratio—are not mechanically
related to each other, historically they have varied in common at
certain times, and this may reflect either parallel behavior of the factors
affecting the determinants or a direct relation between the deter-
minants. Much of the covariation seems to stem from cyclical fluc-
tuations in business activity. Yet, even in such short-run movements,
the determinants display much divergence. Their effects on the money
stock are therefore not the same, and an examination of the behavior of
each determinant is relevant and helps to isolate the main sources of
variations in the money stock.
The analysis here is based on the contribution of each determinant
to the rate of change in the money stock rather than to its absolute
level, for the reasons given in Chapter 1. The rate of change directly
attributable to changes in each of the three determinants can be
derived from formula I(p. 12).That formula can be expressed in
terms of rates of change by first taking natural logarithms,
IC RCR
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and then differentiating with respect to time,
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Theleft-hand side represents the rate of change in the money stock.
The three terms on the right-hand side give the contribution to that18 CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE THREE DETERMINANTS
rate of the rate of change in high-powered money, in the currency
ratio, and in the reserve ratio, respectively.
Since the data exist only for discrete points in time, the instantaneous
rates in formula 2 must be approximated by average rates over a
period. The factors (M/H)(l —R/D)and (M/H)(1 —C/M) inthe
second and third terms can also be approximated by their average
values over each period for which the rates are computed or, as here for
ease of computation, by an average of their values at the beginning and
end of the given period. Approximating the terms in this way, however,
introduces an error or "interaction" term and thereby destroys the
equality. If we express the approximations to the four terms in formula
2 for a given period by m, h, c, and r, respectively, the equation may be
written:
(3) m=h+c+r+€,
where e is the approximation error. This error is usually small and can
be ignored. We may for convenience sometimes refer to the values of
for a succession of periods as the "money series."
The contributions are discussed first in terms of secular growth and
then of cyclical movements.
1. Contributions of the Determinants to Secular Growth
of the Money Stock
Table 2 presents averages for the years 1875—1955 of the contributions
in percentage rates of change and in relative terms. For the relatives,
the contribution of each determinant was divided by the average rate
of change of the money stock.Almost any other terminal dates,
either a few years later or earlier, would give substantially the same
results. The years encompassing U.S. participation in the two world
wars have been segregated in a breakdown of the full period because
of their special character. The table also gives the figures for two
subperiods of about equal length before and after World War I. This
is a convenient point at which to separate the earlier period, in which
the monetary system depended on the gold-standard mechanism,
from the later period, in which that dependence diminished.
The dominant role of high-powered money in the secular growth of
the money stock, indicated by the top three lines of the table, wasCONTRIBUTIONS OF THE THREE DETERMINANTS 19
suggested earlier by the graph of the three determinants in Chart 1.
Wecannow quantify the earlier impression.Increases in high-
powered money accounted for nine-tenths of the growth of the money
stock. The growth of high-powered money occurred chiefly through
growth of the gold stock and, later, after the founding of the Federal
Reserve Banks, also through credit extended by them (Chapter 3).
Particularly large contributions by high-powered money (average
TABLE2
SOURCES OF THE RATE OF CHANGEINTHE STOCK:AVERAGES
































































Source:Same as for Table F—i.
aComputed by an approximation to formula 2 (hence the rates are compounded
instantaneously).The factors In the terms for a and r were approximated by averages
of the beginning and ending values of the factors for each subperiod in the table.
The approximations for each subperiod were also used in computing the contributions
for all years andforthe post—1918 nonwar years.
bc0151 to 4 divided by aol. 1.
CLines may not add exactly to total because of rounding andapproximationerror.
dcovers the two worldwars, Mar. 1917—Nov. 1918 and Nov. 1941—Aug. 1945.
annualrate of 16.3 per cent) occurred during the two world wars,
when government expenditures were partly financed on Federal
Reserve credit; contributions were lower in the nonwar years, both
in absolute and relative terms (average annual rate of 4.3).If we
exclude the first few years of the Federal Reserve System, the growth
of high-powered money was also considerably lower in the earlier
period (from August 1875 to June 1914, not shown in the table, average
annual rate of 3.7 per cent).
The contributions of the two ratios largely offset each other over
most of the periods shown and so produced a combined contribution
of small size.In addition, each ratio separately tended to move in20 CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE THREE DETERMINANTS
different directions in successive periods.This is one reason their
contributions, in amount, were smaller for all years than for
most of the subperiods. The currency ratio declined steadily during
the pre-19l7 period;it declined also during the nonwar years after
1919 but by a smaller amount than in the earlier period, primarily
because of a rise during the 1930's.Its contribution to the nonwar
years was therefore positive, though lower in the later than the earlier
period. The declines were largely offset, however, by sharp increases
during the two world wars, so that the over-all contribution of the
currency ratio from 1875 to 1955, while positive, was small. The
reserve ratio declined sharply after about 1900 and thereby contributed
to the pre-1917 growth of the money stock. That movement was more
than offset for all nonwar years by a later rise and hence a negative
contribution by the reserve ratio to monetary growth during the 1930's.
The subsequent decline of the reserve ratio during World War II
contributed to the wartime growth of the money stock.Because
neither the currency nor the reserve ratio had large declines in the
post-1918 period—whereas both did earlier—the growth of the money
stock was greater in the earlier period, even though the growth of
high-powered money was lower.
What if either or both of the ratios had been constant? Their
relative contributions then show either the fractional reduction in the
growth of the money stock or the fractional increase in the growth of
high-powered money, or some combination of the two, that would
have occurred. The money stock alone might not have had a different
growth rate if the two ratios had been constant, because there is a
mutual dependence between it and high-powered money. Under
the gold standard, changes in income and prices are required by the
balance of international payments.Given the factors determining
output and velocity of money, the change in the money stock was
then a residual: what did not occur through the two ratios, occurred
through high-powered money. Although the dependence was likely
to be strongest under the unfettered gold standard before World War
I, it also operated to some extent afterwards under the Federal Reserve
System. The mutual dependence may have played a weak role in
short-run movements because of long lags, but it surely had a very
important role in most secular movements (see Chapter 3 for discussion
of the evidence). On the other hand, the evidence on the two ratios
(Chapters 4 and 5) suggests that they were not affected in the longCONTRIBUTIONS OF THE THREE DETERMINANTS 21
run by the particular secular rate of growth of either the money stock
or high-powered money; therefore, a different growth rate for high-
powered money, however produced, would have made a corresponding
difference in the growth rate of the money stock.
Aside from the complications of mutual dependence, movements in
the determinants give clues to the sources of change in the rate of
growth of the money stock. Many of those movements raise questions
which an analysis of factors affecting each determinant will help to
answer: Why did high-powered money grow on the average more
slowly before the founding of the Federal Reserve System than after?
(Actually, its faster growth appears to have begun around 1897, as
Chart 1 shows.) To what extent was the growth rate independent of
or a reaction to concurrent movements in the two ratios? Why was
the steady decline in the currency ratio during earlier decades inter-
rupted by sharp increases in the early 1930's and the two world wars?
Why did the reserve ratio decline around 1900 and rise so sharply
during the 1930's? The movements are discussed at length in the
subsequent chapters on the determinants.
2. Contributions of the Determinants to Cyclical Ivlovements
in the Rate of Change in the Money Stock
Specific cycles in the rate of change in the money stock, derived by
Friedman and Schwartz, are listed in Table 1.'All but a few of the
expansions and contractions of specific cycles can be matched with
corresponding phases of reference cycles. The cycles in the money
series that do not match reference cycles have small amplitude and
appear on other grounds to be spurious.2 For this reason and also in
order to analyze the cycles that correspond with business fluctuations,
the unmatched phases have been suppressed in the subsequent analysis.
The specific cycles were divided into stages by the National Bureau
procedure. For the monthly data since May 1907, nine stages were
used; for the preceding annual and semiannual data, five stages, or
fewer when a standing could be computed only by averaging adjacent
stages. The stage omitted was typically VII, in brief contractions for
The specific cycle dates used for the subsequent analysis are based on a slightly
different earlier version of Table I (see notes to Table F-I).
2SeeMilton Friedman and Anna Jacobson Schwartz, "Trends and Cycles in the
Stock of Money in the United States, 1867—1960," a National Bureau study, in prep-
aration.22 CONTRIBUTIONSOF THE THREE DETERMINANTS
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which the annual data available provided only a peak standing in
one year and in the next a trough standing.
Specific cycles emphasize the points of highest and lowest rates of
change, whereas the periods of higher and lower average rates of
change may be more relevant. To allow for this possibility, Appendix
A includes an analysis of step cycles, which mark off periods of higher
and lower average rates of change, constituting expansion and con-
traction phases not further subdivided into stages.Step cycles give
the same results as specific cycles do, so far as the relative importance
of the three determinants is concerned.
SPECIFIC CYCLE PATTERNS
Average patterns are presented in Chart 2 for two pairs of subgroups
of the nonwar cycles—a time grouping segregating the cycles before
and after World War I, and an amplitude grouping segregating the
cycles that are matched to mild and to the six most severe contractions
in aggregate business activity.For each stage, the sum of the con-
tributions of the determinants (the three lower series in each group in
Chart 2) equals, except for the slight approximation error, the top
series which shows the rate of change in the money stock. Some of
the patterns lie mostly above zero because of intracyclical trend in the
determinants, not eliminated. The patterns differ from patterns that
would show the first differences in each ratio, because formula 2 multi-
plies the negative of the differences in each ratio by two positive
factors to derive the ratio's contribution to the money series.Never-
theless, if the patterns shown for each ratio were inverted, they would
provide a fairly good approximation to patterns of its first differences.
Chart 2 reveals a high degree of similarity among the four cycle
groups in the average pattern for each determinant. The post-1918
pattern for the reserve ratio seems at first sight to differ from its earlier
pattern, but that is partly due to the extra stages. If these are excluded,
the pattern is more nearly the same as that for the pre-1914 group.
The similarity is surprising, considering the major developments in our
monetary institutions since World War I.It merits our attention in
subsequent chapters as much or more than the minor changes in the
cyclical behavior of the series over time. While the patterns for the
later subgroup have the larger amplitude, most of the difference
probably reflects the finer measurement provided by the monthly data24 CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE THREE DETERMINANTS
and the greater frequency of severe cycles in the later period. One
notable difference, not explained by the distribution of severe cycles
over time, is the somewhat greater amplitude of fluctuation in the con-
tribution of the reserve ratio in the earlier subgroup.It can be at-
tributed to monetary developments since the turn of the century that
have reduced fluctuations in that ratio (discussed at length in Chapter
5). Effects of those developments on the cyclical pattern of the money
series over time, however, are noticeably absent. Institutional develop-
ments have affected in varying degrees the nature and relative im-
portance of cyclical fluctuations in the three determinants but, to a
much smaller degree, the pattern of fluctuations in the money series
itself.
The expansions and contractions in the contributions of the two
ratios roughly parallel those in the money series.The pattern for
high-powered money, on the other hand, differs considerably from
those of the other series.In mild cycles its pattern hardly deviates
from trend, while in severe cycles it displays two steep peaks.Its
large drop from stage III to stage V in severe cycles accounts for the
rounded peak in the money series.From stage V to stage VII in
those cycles, the decline in the patterns for the two ratios overcomes
the concurrent upswing in the pattern for high-powered money and
accounts for the drop in the money series.In the mild cycles, the
configuration at the peak is slightly different, in that the combined
contribution of high-powered money and of the currency ratio is
almost constant from stage III to stage V, and the contribution of the
reserve ratio alone is mainly responsible for carrying the money series
to a peak.
High-powered money is largely responsible for the sharp movements
of the money series in severe cycles from stage I to stage III and from
stage VII to stage IX. The greater amplitude of the severe-cycle
group over the mild-cycle group reflects those movements and also
larger contributions of the two ratios.It should be noted that the
difference in amplitude between severe and mild cycles is not an
arithmetical consequence of the definition of severe cycles;these are
defined on the basis of the corresponding reference cycles independently
of the amplitude of variation in the money series. The average patterns
for all three determinants have larger fluctuations in the severe-cycle
group than in the mild-cycle group.Nevertheless, the associationCONTRIBUTIONS OF THE THREE DETERMINANTS 25
between the amplitude of variation in the money series from its
peak to its trough stages and the severity of corresponding business
contractions reflects primarily the contributions of the two ratios;
high-powered money has roughly the same average contribution in
the peak and trough stages
RELATIVE CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE DETERMINANTS
TO THE RATE OF CHANGE IN THE MONEY STOCK
Table 3 gives the relative contributions of the three determinants.
The average contribution of each determinant, adjusted to have an
TABLE3
RELATIVE CONTRIBUTIONS OF DETERMINN'4TS TO FIVE STAGES OF NONWAR













ITrough" 100 23 59 18
IIIExpansion 100 86 70 —54
VPeak 100 —14 59 53
VIIContraction 100 63 3 32
IXTrough1' 100 17 44 38
Source:Derived from Table F—i after adjusting for intracyclical
trend by subtracting from each series in every stage of a given cycle
its average value over the five stages of that cycle.
Note:Relative contributions computed as follows:Averages of
the trend—adjusted contributions of each determinant in the nonwar
cycles weredivided by the corresponding average for the money series.
Some of the expansion and contraction stages of the pre—1907 cycles
are omitted because of the limitations of the annual data.
aLines may not add exactly to total because of rounding and approxi-
mation error.
I andIXdiffer only because of their respective inclusion
or exclusion of stage I of the first cycle and stage IX of the last
cycle, and stages I and IX of the war cycles.
averagelevel of zero in each cycle, was divided by the corresponding
average rate of change in the money stock for each of five stages of the
nonwar specific cycles.3 The measures pertain, therefore, to cyclical
fluctuations about the average level. The third line shows, for example,
that the currency ratio accounted, on the average, for 59 per cent of
Chart 2 shows the average contribution to each stage. If we represent these after
adjustment for trend by h3,andwheresdenotesthe stages from I to IX, the
relative average contributions to each stage shown in Table 3 are
—26 CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE THREE DETERMINANTS
TABLEL4
RELATJVtCONTRIBUTIONS OF G€TERMINPNTS TO SPECIFIC CYCLES IN ThE













































































Note;Relative contributions computed as follows:Weighted averages of
the amplitudes of the average trend—adjusted contributions of each determi-
nant to five stages of cycles in the group were divided by the corresponding
weighted average for the moneyseries.The weights were the fractional
number of cycles used in computing the average contributions for each stage.
The weighting is appropriate because expansion or contraction stages are
absent for some of the pre—1907 cycles to the limitations of the annual
data.
Amplitudes were the values of the average trend—adjusted contributions to
each stage, taken positively if the samesignas the corresponding value for
themoneyseries, andnegativelyif the opposite sign.The amplitudes for
the money series were simply its trend—adjusted levels without regard to
sign.
In termsofthe symbols used in footnote 3, an algebraic formula of the






aLines may not add exactly to total because of rounding and approximation
error.
bsevere cycles are those corresponding to the six most severe business
contractions by the ranking in Table 1.Hild cycles comprise all other non—
war cycles.CONTRiBUTIONS OF THE THREE DETERMINANTS 27
the trend-adjusted rate of change in the money stock at peak stages.
The three relative contributions for each stage add up to unity except
for omission of the small approximation error.
The table highlights some features of the cyclical patterns evident
graphically in Chart 2.First, the small contribution of high-powered
money on the average to peak and trough stages;this is a reflection
of its double-peak pattern, in which its contribution to stages V and
IX is small, and to stage V opposite in sign to the money series. Second,
the large contributions of the two ratios to the peak and trough stages,
though the currency ratio contributes importantly also to the expansion
stage and the reserve ratio also to the contraction stage.
The relative contribution for one or two of the determinants can be
and sometimes is negative. When the contribution of a determinant
for a stage has a sign opposite to the rate of change in the money
stock, division of the former by the latter gives a negative number.
For example, if high-powered money declines and the money stock
rises, the relative contribution of high-powered money is negative,
as in stage V. When the contributions of all three determinants do
not have the same sign, the sign of the money series is determined by
the sign of the larger contributions;the smaller contribution, if it
has an opposite sign, is offset and becomes a negative relative con-
tribution.The relative measures therefore indicate the degree of
association between the contributions of each determinant and their
sum, the money series.4
Table 3 brings out the variability of the relative contributions to
cycle stages. Table 4 suppresses this variability among stages by first
averaging together the contributions to the five stages. The measure
in Table 4 can be interpreted as a numerical analogy of Chart 2: the
trend-adjusted contributions of the determinants approximately equal
the areas formed between each pattern in Chart 2 and its average
level. The contributions would exactly equal these areas if Chart 2
were a bar chart instead of having lines connecting the points for
each stage. Areas for each stage on the side of its average level op-
posite the money series areas are counted as negative contributions
'IWhenthe money series is zero, the relatives are infinite and hence undefined.
Though finite, they may be very large in absolute value when the contributions are
large and also of different signs, because the money series may then have a compara-
tively small value. Since the money series actually has no average values close to zero
for the stages examined, this is not a problem.28 OF THE THREE DETERMINANTS
and, on the same side, as positive contributions. To obtain a relative
measure for each determinant, its contributions with appropriate sign
were first weighted and summed over the five stages, then divided by
the corresponding weighted sum for the money series. The weights
are described in a note to the table. An alternative procedure is
first to divide the contribution in each stage by the value of the money
series in that stage, and then to average over the five stages.This
variant, presented in Appendix A, gives largely the same results.
In terms of Table 4,thecurrency ratio is the proximate source of
almost one-half the amplitude of all specific cycles in the money
series, and high-powered money and the reserve ratio are each the
source of about one-fourth. The relative contribution of high-powered
money in all cycles is somewhat enlarged by the inclusion of the
wartime cycles.While the contributions of all three determinants
were exceptionally large during the war cycles, those of high-powered
money were twice those of the two ratios, which is almost the reverse
of the relative contributions of high-powered money and of the cur-
rency ratio for all cycles. The currency ratio accounts for slightly
more than one-half the nonwar cycles and high-powered money, for
only one-fifth;the reserve ratio has a relative contribution of one-
fourth and does not differ significantly between the war- and nonwar-
cycle groups. The primary importance of the currency ratio as the
proximate source of all nonwar cycles in the money series holds also
for most of the subgroups, while the relative contributions of the other
two determinants vary considerably among the subgroups.
These results could be unduly influenced by extreme values in a few
stages of particular cycles, which could swamp the typical values of
many stages. That can be checked by excluding some of the extreme
values.From a frequency distribution of the trend-adjusted con-
tributions of each determinant, I selected for exclusion the three most
extreme values.5 They all occurred in severe cycles after World War I
and exceeded in absolute value 25 per cent per year—a much greater
rate than that of any other contribution of the determinants to the
five stages of nonwar cycles. The excluded three stages were replaced
by an average of the contributions of the determinants in the same
One was a very large rate of increase in high-powered money during stage III of
the 1918—2 1 specific cycle in the money series (see Table F-l). One occurred in stage
IX of the 1927—31 cycle and another in stage I of the 1931—37 cycle; both stages cover
the same period and contain a sharp rise in the currency ratio.
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stage of the two remaining post-1918 severe cycles.The revised
relatives are presented below6 for the two subgroups mainly affected.
As predictable from the nature of the exclusions, the revision raises
the relative importance of the reserve ratio at the expense of high-
powered money and the currency ratio (compare with Table 4). The
amount of the revision, however, is not large, and any further revisions
of this kind, whether or not proper, would have considerably smaller
effects. Hence, extreme values do not account for the over-all results
presented in Table 4.
The relative contributions of high-powered money and the reserve
ratio changed appreciably over time.In the pre-1914 period, high-
powered money had a small relative contribution and the two ratios
were the proximate source of nearly all the cyclical variations in the
money series.In the later period, the relative contributions of high-
powered money and the reserve ratio were reversed. The reversal
can be attributed partly to smaller fluctuations in the reserve ratio,
starting around 1900 and continuing after World War I. The change
in behavior of bank reserves apparently resulted from an improvement
in the stability of the monetary system, which involved for commercial
banks less danger from financial crises—notwithstanding the panics
of 1907 and 1933. The improvement did not affect the average am-
plitude of fluctuations in the money series, however, which remained
as large as ever until the end of World War II. While the amplitude
of variations in the contribution of the reserve ratio diminished from
the earlier to the later period, that of high-powered money increased
and helped to maintain the cyclical amplitude of the money series.
The change in behavior of high-powered money after 1914 resulted
chiefly from the addition of Federal Reserve operations to changes




Line Spec j/ic Cycles Total Money Ratio Ratio
5. 6 cycles, 1918—53 100 36 51 13
6. 6 most severe cycles, 100 21 47 32
1877—1953
Source and computations are the same as for Table 4, except that contributions of
the determinants to the stages listed in footnote 5 were replaced by an average of
contributions to the same stage of the remaining two post-1918 severe cycles.30 CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE THREE DETERMINANTS
Surprisingly little difference in the contributions of the determinants
is shown between cycles corresponding to severe and mild contractions
in business activity.While the contribution of each determinant
fluctuated, on the average, more in severe than in mild cycles, the
increases of all three were of the same order (Chart 2). The increases
reflect in part sharp reactions to banking panics, which occurred in
four of the six severe cycles.Panics enlarged the amplitude of the
cyclical patterns of the determinants but did not greatly alter their
shape. The determinants typically rose in response to a panic re-
flecting, for high-powered money, gold inflows or Treasury or Federal
Reserve operations; for the currency ratio, conversion of deposits into
currency by the public; and for the reserve ratio, contraction of loans
by the banking system. The response of high-powered money therefore
typically contributed to a rise in the rate of change in the money stock,
and that of the two ratios, to a fall, with the latter always predom-
inating. The chief difference in relative contributions between mild
and severe cycles is the somewhat greater value for high-powered
money and lower value for the reserve ratio in severe cycles, and even
that difference for the reserve ratio is entirely eliminated by the ex-
clusion of a few extreme values.7
The reaction of the reserve ratio to severe cycles, however, was more
pronounced than the figures indicate because of its slow response to
panics. In a panic, the public demands currency immediately, which
depletes bank reserves and reduces the reserve ratio.Since time is
required to contract loans and sell bonds, the largest increases in the
ratio come later, very often after increases in the currency ratio have
subsided and after the specific cycle in the money series. Panic-induced
increases in the reserve ratio therefore have often appeared in the
initial stages of the subsequent specific cycle rather than the severe
cycles.Without this delay, the relative contribution of the reserve
ratio to the severe cycles would probably have been greater.
For severe and mild cycles separately, as well as for all nonwar
cycles, high-powered money rose in importance from the earlier to
the later period, and the importance of the reserve ratio declined.
Both changes were much smaller for severe than for mild cycles,
This can be shown by adjusting the post-1918 severe cycles for extreme values
(see footnote 5). The adjusted figures for this subgroup in line 8 of Table 4, reading
left to right, are 22, 54, and 23.CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE THREE DETERMINANTS 31
however, owing to the behavior of the currency ratio, which rose in
importance from the earlier to the later period for severe cycles and
fellin importance for mild cycles.The important differences in
behavior between the two periods were therefore not characteristic of
severe cycles alone, nor do they result from the accidental representation
of the very severe 1929—33 contraction in the subgroup for the later
period, but were even more characteristic of the mild cycles.
The diversity among individual cycles raises a question about the
significance of these results, especially for small subgroups.In Ap-
pendix A the results are compared with several alternative measures
to appraise the importance of particular methods of measurement.
Such a comparison also reveals other characteristics of the cyclical
behavior of the determinants. None of the other measures, however,
contradicts the foregoing observations.
AMPLITUDE OF FLUCTUATIONS IN THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF
THE DETERMINANTS
Although the relative contribution of the currency ratio was,
roughly speaking, twice that of the other two determinants, the am-
plitude of cyclical variations in its contribution was not twice as large.
The relative contributions are a function both of average amplitude
and of conformity to the amplitude of the rate of change in the money
stock. By the previous measures, the relative contributions of a deter-
minant, even though individually large in amplitude, will, if half are
positive and half negative, average close to zero. Table 5 gives the
average amplitudes, computed as follows: The average contributions
of the determinants to each of the five stages, displayed in Chart 2,
were first adjusted for intracyclical trend, and the signs dropped to
give absolute amounts; the data were then averaged for the five stages.
These measures of amplitude show that the contribution of the
currency ratio had the largest fluctuations, but not by much. It was
exceeded in amplitude by the contribution of the reserve ratio in the
earlier period and almost equaled by that of high-powered money in
both periods. The reserve ratio made smaller contributions in the
later than in the earlier period, both absolutely and relative to the
amplitude of the money series. High-powered money and the currency
ratio had larger contributions in the later period, which accounts for
the greater amplitude of the money series in that period.CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE THREE DETERMINANTS
TABLE5
AVERAGE AMPLITUDE OF CONTRIBUTIONS OF DETERMINANTS TO SPECIFIC CYCLES











16nonwar, 1877—1953 6.6 4.4 4.7 3.3
10, 1877—1913 5.3 2.9 3.1 3.7
6, 1918—53 8.5 6.7 6.9 2.6
Source:Same as for Table 3.
Note:Average amplitude computed as follows:The trend—adjusted
contributions of each determinant in absolute value to five stages of






where h is the contribution of high—powered money, N is the number of
stages; the subscript c enumerates the cycles covered from 1877 to 1953
and s the five stages; and similarly for the other series.
Howwould cycles in the money series have been affected ifany
two of the determinants had been constant and only the third had made
contributions? The answer is that the amplitudes of the cycles would
have been reduced, though not by as much as the relative contributions
suggest.Such statements implicitly assume, of course, the independ-
ence of movements in the determinants, discussed shortly.
REGULARITY OF FLUCTUATIONS IN THE CONTRIBUTIONS
OF THE DETERMINANTS
One other aspect of the cyclical behavior of the seriesmay be
examined—regularity. By how much do patterns for individual cycles
deviate from their average pattern? Table 6 gives suchmeasures of
regularity and their ratio to the corresponding average amplitudes
in Table 5. To compute the measures, the trend-adjusted contribution
of a determinant in each stage was subtracted from itsaverage con-
tribution in that stage among cycles.These deviations were then
averaged without regard to sign. Average deviations for cycles in the
money series were derived in the same way.
For all nonwar cycles together, the contributions of the reserve ratio
had the smallest average deviation and hence the greatest regularity,
32
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though not as a percentage of average amplitude.The greater
over-all regularity of the reserve ratio reflects its regular behavior in
severe as well as mild cycles. In the severe cycles, high-powered money
and the currency ratio often fluctuated violently and, as might be
expected, irregularly from one cycle to the other. The main response
TABLE6
REGULARITYOF CONTRIBUTIONS OF DETERMINANTS TO SPECIFIC CYCLES IN
ThETREND—ADJUSTED RATE OF CHANGE IN THE I'VNEY STOCK, 1877—1953
Average Deviation of Contri-
butions from Stage Averagesa
(per cent per year)
Average Deviation as a
Percentage of Amplitudeb
High— Cur— Re— High— Cur— Re—
MoneyPoweredrencyserveMoneyPoweredrencyserve
Specific Cycles StockMoney RatioRatioStock Money RatioRatio
nonwar, 1877—1953
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
16 4.3 4.4 4.0 2.9 65 100 85 88
10, 1877—1913 2.9 2.7 2.3 2.9 55 93 74 78
6, 1918—53 5.9 7.8 7.0 3.7 69 116 101 142
6 most severe,
l877—1953C 5.7 5.5 6.5 2.8 n.c. n.c. n.c. rt.C.
10 mild, 2.4 3.7 2.1 2.7 n.c. n.c. n.c. n.c.
Source:Same as for Table 3.
Note:n.c.notcomputed.
as follows:Differences in absolute value between trend—adjusted con-
tributions of each determinant to five stages of cycles in the group and average
contribution of the determinant for each stage were averaged.Symbolically (see






and similarlyfor the other series.
bc016.14divided by the corresponding cols. of Table 5.
CSas Table 4.
of the reserve ratio to those cycles, as suggested earlier, occurred later
during the succeeding specific cycle, always mild except in the l930's.
For the mild cycles, the currency ratio had the most regular patterns.
The contributions of the reserve ratio became less regular after
World War I.In view of their reduced amplitude in the later period,
the small decline in their regularity probably stemmed entirely from
the greater frequency of severe cycles in the post-1918group, which
also partly explains why the contributions of the other two determinants
became less regular in the later period.This explanation does not
help much with high-powered money, however.The regularity34 Co NTRIB U TI0 NS OF THE THREE DE TERMINA N TS
measure for this determinant was less for pre-1914 cycles than for all
mild cycles, and excluding severe cycles from the pre-1914 figure would
reduce it. The higher figure for all mild cycles means, therefore, that
the measure would be higher for mild cycles after World War I than
before. Such comparisons of the contributions of the two ratios, on the
other hand, suggest little change in their regularity for mild cycles
before and after World War I.
The regularity of cycles in the money series reflects the regularity of
cycles in the three determinants—though not additively, since move-
ments in the determinants partly offset each other. The money series
had less regularity in the latter period, in part because severe cycles
were relatively more numerous, and in part because the contribution
of high-powered money was less regular even in mild cycles.Since
the table covers only three mild cycles for the latter period, this result
cannot be taken to indicate a trend. Indeed, so far, cyclical variations
in the money series since World War II have been fairly moderate.
INTERDEPENDENCE OF FLUCTUATIONS IN THE
CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE DETERMINANTS
Movements in the determinants could be directly or indirectly re-
lated, as noted. We need to consider how strong such interrelations are.
One indication is provided by the correlation coefficients presented in
Table 7 between the contributions of the determinants.The ob-
servations are for the cycle stages covered by the preceding tables,
TABLE7
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE DETERMINANTS TO FIVE STAGES


























Source:Same as for Table 3.
8Significantly different from zero at the .01 level.
aAS defined in Table 4, footnote b.CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE THREE DETERMINANTS 35
usually five stages per cycle (three or four for some of the earlier cycles).
The coefficients show no significant covariation between the con-
tributions of the two ratios but do show a small but significant inverse
covariation between their contributions and those of high-powered
money. Since contributions of the two ratios to the money series are
inverse to their first differences, the correlations indicate a tendency
of high-powered money to move in parallel with the two ratios.
This correlation •is subject to various interpretations.It may reflect
a direct relation between the determinants in one or both directions
or a similar response to other economic variables.Of the many
possibilities, the least likely is a dependence of the two ratios on high-
powered money. No evidence of it can be found in the analyses
reported in later chapters. One widely alleged kind of such dependence
concerns the reserve ratio: when high-powered money declines and
the money market tightens, banks may be pressed for funds, and they
may allow their reserve ratios to fall, at least temporarily.8 Thus there
might be an inverse relation between the contributions of high-powered
money and of the reserve ratio to the money series. This implies that
the reserve ratio is affected by interest rates, discussed at length in
Chapter 5. Despite much attention in the literature, the relation is not
supported by the data examined later.
An appealing explanation of the observed intercorrelation is that
high-powered money has a direct dependence on the two ratios. As
indicated in Chapter 1, the gold-standard mechanism and central-
bank actions to stabilize the economy might be expected to produce
such a dependence. Since this explanation implies that high-powered
money depends on the combined contribution of the two ratios, Table 8
presents correlation coefficients between their combined contribution
and that of high-powered money and—to study the relationship
closely—separately for each stage of the nonwar specific cycles before
and after World War I.Measuring the correlation among cycles for
each stage separately avoids all spurious intracyclical covariation
that exists between stages.Stages II, IV,VI,and VIII, excluded
from the previous tables, are included here for the latter period. The
adjustment of the data for trend used previously has been omitted here
on the ground that any interdependence may apply to trend as well
They may also (since 1914) apply to Federal Reserve Banks for loans, which
would offset some of the contraction in high-powered money.36 CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE THREE DETERMiNANTS
TABLEB
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN THE COMBINED CONTRIBUTION OF THE CURRENCY AND
RESERVE RATIOS AND TI-IAT OF HIGH—POWERED frONEY TO VARIOUS STAGES OF









































































Source:Table F—i; no adjustment for trend.
a05
or lower.
bEach trough in the cyclegroup included once.
Excluding 1918—21 cycle.
n.s. —notsignificant.
asto cyclical elements in the series. The coefficients in Table 8 are
generally greater than those in Table 7 because they are a weighted
sum of the corresponding correlation coefficients between the con-
tributions of high-powered money and each ratio individually.9
Though many are fairly high, the correlations in Table 8 for in-
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War I and 6 after), and many of the coefficients are insignificant at
the 0.05 level. The significant coefficients do not occur all in the same
stages of the later and earlier cycles. For the earlier cycles, the correla-
tion is significant in all but the peak stages; for the later cycles, in stages
III, V, and VI only, covering the middle part of each specific cycle in
the money series (unless the 1918—21 cycle is excluded). In the bottom
two lines of the table, stages of the later cycles are combined into two
groups. The group of four stages III through VI has a substantially
larger negative regression coefficient than the group of other stages
has.
For the later cycles, the results are heavily influenced by Federal
Reserve credit outstanding.It is plausible, as an explanation of the
particular pattern of the correlation coefficients, that the Reserve
Banks typically took more vigorous action to dampen variations in the
rate of change in the money stock in its expansion and peak stages than
in its contraction and trough stages.It is consistent with what is
known of Federal Reserve policies during much of the l920's and
1930's, the periods mostly covered by the calculations.After being
criticized for its part in the World War I inflation, the Federal Reserve
Board was for many years highly sensitive about doing anything that
might contribute to inflation; its steps to counteract speculation in the
1928—29 stock market boom, for example, are well known. In contrast,
the idea that vigorous monetary expansion should accompany business
contractions has developed slowly and has gained wide acceptance only
since World War II. The results in Table 8 throw together diverse
cycles, of course, and do not distinguish possible differences in Federal
Reserve behavior over the period. That the money series has displayed
less fluctuation since World War II suggests that the Reserve Banks
have offset the two ratios more completely since then than previously,
though a detailed analysis of more postwar cycles would be necessary
to confirm it.
For the pre-1914 cycles, a similar explanation would emphasize the
offsetting effects of gold flows and, to a lesser extent, of Treasury
operations.The regression coefficient is much lower for all stages
together than for each of the stages individually, because the constant
term of the regression differs among stages.This means that the
offset is probably lower computed from stage-to-stage variations than
from cycle-to-cycle variations for a given stage.38 CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE THREE DE TERMINA N TS
If we accept the regression coefficients at face value, they imply that
the dampening effect of gold flows before 1914 and Federal. Reserve
actions thereafter did not prevent the two ratios from independently
affecting the money stock.'° For the earlier cycles, variations in the
combined contribution of the two ratios were offset by one-fourth, and
for the later cycles also by one-fourth in stages VII through II and by
nine-tenths in stages III through VI.Hence, the Federal Reserve
Banks appear to have increased the offset materially, but for one part
of each specific cycle only. The fact that the offset varied in relative
amount among different stages of the cycle, particularly in the later
period, is perhaps one reason the contribution of high-powered money
appears to be so erratic.
That the Reserve Banks were responsible, through control of high-
powered money, for all variations in the money series is possible but
very unlikely.If a particular pattern were to be produced in the
money series through high-powered money, the desired pattern would
be superimposed on the contributions of the two ratios.The con-
tribution of high-powered money would then be composed of two
parts, an offset to the two ratios and the desired pattern, and the total
would not necessarily be closely related to either.Its relative con-
tribution might even be low and the (negative) correlation with the
combined contribution of the two ratios less than perfect, just as we
find.But, if so, the regression coefficient would be unity or approxi-
mately so, which it is not for all stages, and the average cyclical pattern
of the money series would bear little resemblance, except by accident,
to the contributions of the two ratios. As shown by Chart 2, however,
the patterns of their contributions and of the money series are similar.'1
We may tentatively infer that the two ratios played an important
independent role in the specific cycles Of the money series. As measures
of that conformity, their relative average contributions are relevant;
10 The regression coefficients are an understatement of the offset, only if the other
factors determining high-powered money left out of the regression (defined to affect it
positively) are positively correlated with the combined contribution of the two ratios.
This seems unlikely for offsets due to policy, in view of the out-of-phase relation
between variations in the money series and business activity.
It Conceivably, this could result, not from the effect of the currency ratio on the
money stock, but from a dependence of the currency ratio on the money stock owing
to temporary redistributions of money balances, when new money enters the economy,
between sectors that maintain different currency ratios. This possibility is examined in
Chapter 4 and found unimportant.
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though, in view of the offsetting effects of high-powered money, the
measures overstate in varying degrees the role of the two ratios.
Indeed, in view of Federal Reserve pronouncements during much
of the period that it was not concerned solely with what happened
to the money stock and was not to be considered fully responsible for
it, the correlation coefficients for the later period may not reflect
predesigned Federal Reserve policies at all. The correlations for both
periods may reflect, instead, a similar response of high-powered money
and the two ratios to business cycles.Such an indirect relation does
not require or imply any direct dependence of the determinants on
each other. Indirect relations clearly affected the regression coefficient
for stage III, because deliberate offsetting movements would not
produce a regression coefficient greater than unity.Although both
kinds of influence imply interdependence, they lead to quite different
interpretations of the sources of change in the money stock.Un-
fortunately, there is no simple way to measure the relative importance
of the two kinds of interdependence.
Other considerations do not resolve the ambiguity of the available
evidence.First, the correlation coefficients between the Concurrent
contributions of the two ratios in Table 7 are all virtually zero. This
implies that the two were not affected in a common way by business
cycles.It is therefore unlikely that either ratio and high-powered
money were affected in a common way, unless possibly the effects had
lags of quite different lengths. Barring that, the correlations in Table
8 seem to reflect (except stage III of the later cycles) a direct depend-
ence of high-powered money on the two ratios.
Yet, the implication of this inference conflicts with our under-
standing of how such a dependence would operate. The inferred
dependence might be expected to operate sluggishly and with con-
siderable delay, which casts doubt on the foregoing interpretation of
Tables 7 and 8. We may perhaps be willing to accept the implication
of small delay for Federal Reserve operations in the later cycles, but
what about the earlier ones? Did gold flows and Treasury actions
offset concurrently one-fourth of the combined contribution of the two
ratios? That gold flows could work so rapidly is questionable, since
they respond to changes in the money stock by way of induced changes
in prices and the balance of international payments. Treasury oper-
ations were too small and erraticto account allalone for the40 Co N TRIll UTIO NS OF THE THREE DETERMINANTS
correlation. We seem to face a dilemma. If we interpret the correla-
tions for the later period as reflecting Federal Reserve actions to offset
movements in the two ratios, it seems only reasonable to attribute a
corresponding role to gold flows (and in part to Treasury operations)
in the earlier period.
One way to resolve the dilemma is to attribute most of the cor-
relation in the earlier period to parallel responses of the determinants
to business cycles, and just the increase in the degree of correlation from
the earlier to the later period to Federal Reserve actions. By this
interpretation, one-fourth of the contributions of high-powered money
and the two ratios offset each other because of their similar responses
to business cycles.In the later period, that offset seems to account
for all the correlation in stages VII through II and for part—a fourth
to a third—of the correlation in stages III through VI. For the latter
stages, the regression coefficient suggests that Federal Reserve Banks
were responsible for offsetting an additional 65 per cent or so (nine-
tenths minus one-fourth) of the movements in the two ratios, though
this is overstated by the large regression coefficient in stage III. The
part of the coefficient in excess of unity cannot in any meaningful
sense be interpreted as an intended offset and probably reflects the
common effects of business cycles.
Covariation among the determinants means that some of their
contributions to the money series were offset and, in a sense, were not
contributions at all.There is no entirely satisfactory formula for
correcting their relative contributions for interdependence. One way
to make a rough adjustment, however, is to use the figures in Table 8
to delete the part of the contributions of the determinants that was
offset, which leaves the money series the same, and to recompute the
relative contributions with the part not offset.If we assume that the
covariation always added to the combined relative contribution of
the two ratios and subtracted from the relative contribution of high-
powered money, we may adjust the former downward and the latter
upward. This assumption probably holds for most cycle stages, but it
produces some overstatement of the true correction. To the extent that
the covariation reflects the common effects of business cycles, the square
of the correlation coefficient is an estimate of the fraction offset of cyclical
variations in the contributions. To the extent that the covariation
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two ratios, the regression coefficient is an estimate of the fraction offset
of cyclical variations in the contributions of the two ratios.
In the earlier period, for which the tentative conclusion was that the
covariation reflects the common effects of business cycles, we may in
the foregoing manner adjust the relative contributions shown on line 4
of Table 4. The corresponding correlation coefficient in Table 8 is
—0.49 and its square is 0.24.If we reduce the relative contributions
of the currency and reserve ratios by 24 per cent, they both become
36 per cent.Their combined relative contribution is therefore 72
per cent (instead of 95 per cent as shown in Table 4), and the remaining
28 per cent is the contribution of high-powered money (instead of 3
per cent as shown in the table)•12
Forthe later period, the conclusion was, again, that part of the
cyclical variations in the contributions reflects the common effects of
business cycles—perhaps one-fourth, as in the earlier period, perhaps
less.If a fourth, the implied adjustment of line 5 in Table 4 lowers the
relative contributions of the currency and reserve ratios to 42 and 5
per cent, respectively (from 56 and 7), and raises that of high-powered
money to 53 per cent (from 37).In addition, an additional offset of
about 65 per cent of the contributions of the two ratios to stages III
through VI was perhaps due to actions of the Federal Reserve Banks, a
total offset of nearly 90 per cent.This would further reduce the
relative contributions of the two ratios in those stages to about 6 and 1
per cent, respectively, and raise that of high-powered money to 93 per
cent. Although these adjustments for the earlier period do not change
our previous ranking of the relative contributions of the determinants,
the ranking for the later cycles is altered radically. The corrections
imply that high-powered money was the primary contributor to the
later cycles, and a moderate contributor to the earlier cycles, ranking
Itwould understate the adjustment to estimate it as 24 per cent of the original
relative contribution of high-powered money, 3 per cent, which is quite iow because
of the negative relative contributions of this determinant to the money series in certain
stages. The procedure in the text assumes that the combined relative contribution
of the two ratios was positive in all stages, which is true for the averages over the two
periods discussed. Of course, the correlation coefficient is only an estimate of the
average size of the correction, which theoretically is some function of the unspecified
variables that produce the common fluctuations in the determinants.
A more accurate procedure than followed here would be to adjust the contributions
in each stage of each cycle before computing the average relative contributions. This
procedure would lend an appearance of detailed exactness to the results, however, that
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third after the two ratios.While admittedly crude, the foregoing
corrections may be taken as a rough (and probably exaggerated) in-
dication of the part played by interdependence.
SUMMARY OF CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE DETERMINANTS
TO CYCLICAL MOVEMENTS IN THE RATE OF CHANGE
IN THE MONEY STOCK
The three proximate determinants of the money stock reflect the
behavior of three sectors of the economy: high-powered money, the
behavior of the government; the currency ratio, of the public; arid
the reserve ratio, of commercial banks. The formula presented at the
beginning of this chapter defines the contribution of each determinant
to the rate of change in the money stock. Although the formula can be
approximated fairly closely for finite periods, there are many ways to
compute the average relative contribution of the determinants over a
period of time. The method adopted here was to use specific cycle
stages of the money series and to compute various averages of the
relative contributions. They bring out the relative importance of the
channels through which cyclical variations in the money series occurred
and provide a first step in identifying the factors responsible for those
variations.
By these measures—and ignoring interdependence for the moment—
the currency ratio is the chief contributor to specific cycles in the rate
of change in the money stock, equaling the contributions of the other
two determinants combined. The importance of its contributions
reflects their large amplitude and their tendency to parallel those of
the other two determinants; both attributes kept its contributions in
conformity with the resulting cycles in the money series. The con-
tributions of high-powered money, while just as large in amplitude,
were very irregular and did not parallel the money series closely. The
contributions of the reserve ratio had a fairly regular cyclical pattern
but a comparatively small amplitude, though in the pre-1914 period
its relative contribution rivaled that of the currency ratio.
The above statements should be amended to take account of inter-
dependence among the contributions of the determinants. Interpreta-
tion of interdependence is hazardous, and the inferences made must
be viewed as highly tentative. We found that perhaps 90 per cent of the
combined contribution of the two ratios in stages III through VI ofCONTRIBUTIONS OF THE THREE DETERMINANTS 43
the later cycles was offset by the contribution of high-powered money,
presumably in large part a result of intentional Federal Reserve
policy.The erratic contribution of high-powered money in those
cycles may be explained in part by that dependence. A weaker
correlation for the other stages and for the earlier cycles suggests an
offset of 25 per cent with the same effect but for the different reason
that the determinants responded in a similar way to business cycles.
There is no entirely satisfactory way to take account quantitatively
of this covariation in the measures of relative contribution. The ad-
justment used here suggests that, after deleting the part offset of the
contributions, each of the three determinants produced about one-
third of the pre-1914 specific cycles in the money series, the two ratios
accounting for slightly more than high-powered money did. For the
post-1918 cycles, stages VII through II and III through VI should be
treated separately.For stages Vu—h we found, after adjustment,
that high-powered money made the largest contribution, though it
and the currency ratio each produced almost half the cyclical varia-
tions in the money series, and the reserve ratio the small remainder.
For stages Ill—VI, high-powered money was responsible for nearly all
the cyclical variations in the money series.
Although the corrected figures may overemphasize, if anything,
the contribution of high-powered money, they may still seem surprising,
because they do not attribute all variations in the money series in the
later period to high-powered money, and because they attribute an
important role to the currency ratio in both periods. High-powered
money dominated secular movements in the money series.Even in
discussions of cyclical movements, high-powered money and the
reserve ratio have generally received all the attention, while the
currency ratio has been little noticed. One reason for the differential
treatment is that sources of variation in high-powered money and the
reserve ratio involve activities of the government and banks—both
easy to discuss (and exaggerate)—whereas sources of variation in the
currency ratio involve actions of innumerable holders of money and
are, except in panics, obscure. While many students of the money
supply have been aware of variations in the currency ratio, the present
results highlight their importance, not only in panics but also for all
cycles in the money series.
The emphasis on panics in discussions of the currency ratio has44 CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE THREE DETERMINANTS
perhaps created the mistaken impression that the sources of change
in the money series differ radically between panic cycles and mild
cycles, whereas the difference is in fact small. The important dif-
ferences among the cycles in the money series occur between those
before and after the establishment of the Federal Reserve Banks;
fluctuations in high-powered money became larger and a more im-
portant source of variation in the money series thereafter while, except
for the 1930's, the reserve ratio lost much of its earlier volatility.
Despite the occurrence of fewer panics after World War I, however,
the cyclical behavior of the currency ratio has remained largely un-
changed. In view of the changing sources of variations in the money
series over time, it is remarkable that those variations have remained
so similar both in amplitude and in their timing relation to reference
cycles (a point taken up again in Chapter 6).
w